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Abstract:
How does vote intention in presidential elections vary according to the economic
conditions of a country, especially indicators of the financial market? Does the state of
the economy, both its fundamentals as well as capital market, affect variation in
candidates’ percentage of vote intention in national polls? This paper tests how economic
indicators influence vote intention in presidential elections in two emerging markets:
Brazil and Mexico. The presidential elections of 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006 in Brazil
and 2000 and 2006 in Mexico are analyzed using all poll returns for each electoral period
and corresponding economic data. The paper finds that no theory is capable of explaining
results throughout the dataset but partisan explanations and Stokes’ (2001) categories of
alternatives to retrospective voting help elucidate vote intention.

Preliminary Version: Do not quote or cite with explicit authorization from the authors.

Prepared for Presentation at the 2009 Meeting of the American Political Science
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1. Introduction
This paper aims to build on previous research on vote intention and behavior
(Stokes 2001, Alesina et al 1997) to understand how economic and financial data affect
vote intention in Brazilian and Mexican presidential elections. Brazil and Mexico are the
largest countries in Latin America and have both democratized in recent decades. Both
countries have very important emerging markets that have generated enthusiasm as well
as crises within other emerging markets. The role of political risk in these markets has
been central and drove much of crisis in Mexico in 1994 and Brazil in 1998 and 2002
(Spanakos and Renno, 2009). As Whitehead has argued, risk in emerging markets
normally heightens before and after elections (2006). Not surprisingly, not only are
financial analysts and policy-makers paying close attention to economic and financial
data, increasingly so are voters.
This paper explores the question of whether economic and financial data affect
vote intention. Renno and Spanakos (2006) claimed that country risk evaluations,
measured by bond spreads, were quite sensitive to poll results in Brazil, but that the
inverse was not true: polls did not vary so much because of risk assessment. In a more
recent study, comparing distinct countries in Latin America, they find that risk
assessments were sensitive in some elections, but not others and that there was no clear
pattern that the rise of left-wing parties to government increased risk evaluations
(Spanakos and Renno, 2009).
This paper attempts to evaluate, in a comparative perspective, how sensitive vote
intentions (vote for left-wing parties) are to the state of the fundamentals of the economy
(inflation and unemployment) and financial market indicators (country risk evaluations,
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exchange rates) controlling for various international indicators of instability (VIX,
commodity prices), Central Bank independence and political variables (party system age,
country specific effects and causal heterogeneity by electoral episode). This is, therefore,
an initial attempt to measure how the economy and financial markets affect vote
intentions in a comparative perspective focusing on emerging markets.
2. Economic Voting in Comparative Perspective
Studies about how the economy affects elections abound and have many
ramifications. There are those based on individual level data evaluating pocketbook and
sociotropic economic vote; there are studies of aggregate level data investigating how
economic outcomes affect government evaluation and vote in the developing and
developed world; and there are studies about how financial markets influence
government evaluation. On the other hand, there are no studies on how financial markets,
controlling for the state of the economy’s fundamentals, influence vote intentions
comparing several elections in two developing nations. This present paper attempts to fill
this gap.
No single theory can explain the complex relationship between political moments,
such as elections, and financial and economic variables. The central claim in this paper is
that a combination of global economic conditions, local aspects of the financial market,
and the fundamentals of national economies must be considered in explaining variations
in vote intention in developing countries. Furthermore, the effects of the distinct
explanatory variables will vary by electoral period, depending on clarity of the
candidates’ rhetoric and incumbents’ performance.
2A. Partisan Models
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While classical partisan models of political economy emphasize how the partisan
identity of a government impacts economic indicators in developed countries (Hibbs
1977, Alesina et al 1997), recent contributions analyze developing countries and give
more attention to the way electoral periods affect financial markets as opposed to
macroeconomic indicators. Using financial market data from 1975-1998 for 78
developing countries, David Leblang (2002) found that speculative attacks are most
likely to occur during a Left-wing government and after an election. Vaaler et al, using
data from 20 developing countries find that financial markets are most concerned about a
shift to the left during elections, but not the reelection of a candidate of the left (Block
and Vaaler 2004; Vaaler, et al 2006). These studies seem to confirm the basic premises of
partisan theories: 1) that market actors distinguish politicians of the left and the right; 2)
once in office politicians justify such distinctions; 3) market actors make investment
decisions during electoral periods based upon the ideology of the likely victor.
Though very interesting, these studies, as large N studies, are limited by the need
to maintain comparability of data (George and Bennett 2005, 19). For example, they face
a problem of what Herron calls “magnitude of partisanship,” or how far the distance is
between left and right (2000: 327). Investors are unlikely to consider the partisan effect
of a Michael Foot or a Tony Blair identical, though statistical analysis labels them both
“left.” Similarly, if Castañeda is correct, there should be markedly different responses to
Latin America’s moderate, institutionalist left and its radical, populist and antiinstitutionalist left (Castañeda and Navia 2007). Moreover, even if the left-right divide
can be assumed to be equivalent in large N studies, the analyst must also understand their
meaning in terms of the institutionalization of the party system (Mainwaring 1999).
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To deal with these issues, a specific variable for party system institutionalization,
which conditions the clarity of party’s ideology and “brand names,” is included in the
current model (Lupia and McCubbins 2000). Second, the model investigates in detail the
role of partisan explanations vis-à-vis other theories through an in-depth discussion of
each election. The hypotheses derived from these theories are that left-wing parties
should benefit from deterioration in employment and not be so harmed by deterioration in
inflation.
2B. Restrospective Economic Voting
The literature on vote choice places a very strong emphasis on economic voting.
The argument here is very simple: voters punish and reward incumbents for their
performance in office. The main form of holding representatives accountable for their
performance in office is for voters to reelect a politician or party based on his or her
perception of the current state of the economy. Satisfaction leads to a vote for the
incumbent and dissatisfaction the opposition. Hence, the central claim of this literature is
that voters focus more on the incumbent performance as reflected by economic
conditions, and less on partisan or ideological issues (Fiorina 1981).
Hence, the expectation here is that deterioration in the economy would lead to
support of the opposition. If a left-wing party is in the opposition, it will benefit from
weaker economic performance: If the left-wing party is the incumbent, it will suffer from
weaker economic performance.
2C. Global constraints
New partisan research recognizes the importance of ‘contextual variation,’
specifically that “in small, open economies, domestic policy makers may retain less
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autonomy over some policies… than in larger, less-exposed economies” (Franzese 2002,
371). External constraints upon domestic policy-making have long been a concern in
Latin America and much of the international political economy literature seems to argue
that globalization weakens the role of domestic politics making autonomous policymaking impossible (Cardoso and Faletto 1979, Garrett 1998, Wallerstein 2004).
Susan Strange warned that while “states were once the masters of markets, now it
is markets which, on many crucial issues, are the masters over the governments of states”
(in Garrett 1998, 787). In his study of capital mobility and development in Latin America
Mahon (1996) finds support for the idea of a virtual senate of asset-holders because of
constraints they impose on domestic policy and a similar argument is made by Mosley
(2003) who argues that investors have a powerful voice in emerging market countries’
political arenas.
Without a doubt, world commodity prices and risk tolerance on global capital
markets play a fundamental role in providing constraints and opportunities for emerging
markets. Similarly, capital flows into/out of one emerging market are often very
influenced by events in another emerging market or in the region as a whole. But
contagion is often exaggerated and bondholders do distinguish on the basis of policy
choices and investment climates particular to an emerging market. Still, this paper tests
whether the global conditions influence domestic politics by including variables that
capture the overall level of risk and openness of international markets.
2D. Variations in Vote Calculi
Stokes (2001a) has made a significant effort in comparing how the economy
affects vote choice in developing countries by arguing that the impact of the economy on
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elections is not as straightforward or evident as it is in the developed world. The main
tenets in the developing world are that a decline in economic performance will encourage
voters to vote for the opposition. Given that elections in developed countries have certain
attributes absent in the new democratic regimes, like alternation in power, strong party
reputations, and clear programmatic proposals by candidates, the choices seem simpler in
more consolidated democratic regimes.
In Latin America, the situation is much more complex since the region has not
only recently witnessed transitions to democracy (still contentious in many countries) but
also lived through very dramatic processes of economic stabilization and reform. The
politics of economic stabilization eventually resolved deep issues like hyperinflation but
generated others such as recession, increased sensitivity to fluctuations in global capital
markets, and stop-and-start economic growth (Ferrari and Spanakos 2009). In such
turbulent economic environments, voters were willing to support politicians who
promised long-term solutions even if generating short-term pain (Stokes 2001a). In other
words, voters often chose incumbents and challenges that could be associated with the
promise of, at least short-term, economic constriction.
This is a considerable challenge to the traditional form of voting in democratic
regimes, which expects ‘retrospective’ evaluations of the economy. To explain the puzzle
of voters’ choice, Stokes and the various authors in her book point out that voters could
employ various other forms of vote calculi (Stokes 2001). Voters could: adopt an
intertemporal perspective, in which hardship in the present was seen as a necessary step
for bonanza in the future; adopt an exonerating posture, in which the current crises was
either be blamed factors external to the incumbent or the opposition was considered

7

worse; take an oppositionist stance, in that the incumbent is always poorly evaluated,
independent of the economy and voters could discount changes in the aggregate economy
if they felt that there was a real improvement/worsening in the distribution of wealth and
resources (Stokes 2001a).
In their analyses, the theoretical arguments above revert into expectations about
how economic indicators, basically inflation and unemployment, should impact
incumbent evaluations in the different countries. The main argument is that the traditional
expectations of the economic voting literature, that when the economy goes bad,
incumbents loose support, might not simply hold in the new democracies studied on
Stokes edited volume. Intertemporal calculi will, for instance, lead to the fact that falling
economic performance may lead to an increase in support for the government based on
the expectation and government justifications that short-term losses will lead to long-term
gains. An exonerating posture explains why, sometimes, economic factors may not be
associated with government evaluations, as does an oppositionist approach. There is also
the possibility that voters will maintain an ideological voting line, even if their
representatives are less capable of producing results expected by rational partisan theories
(Alesina et al 1997).
Stokes’ typology is employed within the model used to analyze vote intention in
Mexico and Brazil. The Mexican case was studied by Jorge Buendia (2001) and he found
that Mexico is a classical case of traditional retrospective voting. Brazil was not included
in her project, but previous studies have also identified traces of economic voting in
Brazil. This paper adds a comparative element and includes new cases and datapoints. It
analyzes all poll results in the year of the election for four elections in Brazil and two in
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Mexico in order to focus on vote intentions and not on government evaluations and more
clearly argue how the economy affects votes. The addition of the 2006 election in Mexico
is important given the controversy surrounding it; it was the first election in which the
PRI was not an incumbent, and the first election since the 1988 debacle in which the PRD
candidate conceivably could have won.
Brazil and Mexico are very interesting cases because they are important emerging
markets with recent processes of democratic transition and institution building, and they
have both witnessed recent elections in which left-wing parties have fared quite well.
Brazil saw the rise of Lula da Silva to government in 2002, backed by a quite unique
political party in the Brazilian landscape. The PT is a party with deep social roots tracing
back to social movements, labor unions and progressive church groups, the Eclesial Base
Communities. Lula da Silva, a typical migrant from the northeast, was the first in his
family to receive technical training. His rise to power was a watershed moment in
Brazilian history, but one also marked by market unrest at first. As was said, 2002 was an
interesting episode of how financial markets and vote for the left could intertwine. Still,
Lula no just won the election, but became a favorite of financial market sectors. His 2006
run did not activate the intense reaction of financial indicators that occurred in 2002.
Mexico faced a potentially turbulent election in 2006, but the possible victory of
Lopez Obrador, from the left-wing Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), did not
generate the same reactions that occurred in Brazil in 2002. The fact that the 2006
elections also saw the astonishing rise in polls of Felipe Calderón from the right-wing
Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), who shot out from obscurity to wining a highly
contested election.
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3. Data and Variables
This paper analyzes variation in vote intention for left-wing parties in Brazil and
Mexico using poll results for all polls conducted in the several presidential elections
analyzed here. The main dependent variable, therefore, is the percentage of vote
intentions for the two main Left-wing parties in Brazil and Mexico: the Partido dos
Trabalhadores (PT) in Brazil and the Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD) in
Mexico.
These countries were selected because of the importance of their markets and
because they display a range of partisan and policy orientations, offering a diverse set of
situations that can be analyzed. Brazil witnessed a shift towards the left in the period
studied. Although Mexico had no governments of the left, the candidate of the left came
within 1% point of winning the 2006 elections. The shifts toward the left in the 2002
election in Brazil and to a lesser extent in Mexico 2006 constitute ‘crucial cases’ in
evaluating partisan theories (Eckstein 1975, 118). Other observations produce results
unexpected by partisan accounts, namely: support for Lula in 2006 coincided with a
decrease in risk; yet the reelection Cardoso (Brazil 1998) did (Spanakos and Renno,
2009).
The unique dataset employed here has a cross-sectional time series structure, in
which each election (1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 in Brazil and 2000 and 2006 in Mexico) is
considered as a panel and the polls are ordered based on their dates of release. The
dataset is quite complex because the number of polls in each election year is not identical,
hence panels are unbalanced, and the interval between polls in each year is also unequal,
hence lags are unequally spaced. The analysis tried to take these factors into
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consideration by estimating models that take into account the structure of the data set and
avoiding using lagged terms because of the unequal spacing. There is, however, a more
significant limitation to the analysis that may attenuate the impact of economic variables
on vote intentions in that while vote intention is measured on a daily basis, many of the
economic variables are only available monthly. Hence, the values of the economic
variables vary much less than that of vote intentions for the left. The ideal dataset would
be one with daily data on the economic variables to measure also lags in how long it
takes for economic variables to be reflected in oscillation in vote intention. Unfortunately,
economic data is not collected with such speed. Financial market data does allow for
daily data, but some of the older elections are beyond the period available to financial
sector analysts, and thus the authors of this paper, and so for older elections the dataset
uses end of the month evaluations for country risk.
The main explanatory variables are derived from the theoretical expectations
outlined before. The central indicator of risk is JP Morgan Chase’s EMBI. The EMBI is
the price that investors are willing to pay for the sovereign debt of a given country at a
specific moment in time. It is the spread of the yield of a sovereign bond relative to that
of a US Treasury bond (considered a zero-risk benchmark) of a similar maturityi.
Increasing in the cost of government borrowing raises the cost of borrowing across the
economy, slowing growth and increasing indebtedness. When debt is denominated in
foreign currency, this places additional pressures on monetary policy and foreign
exchange reserves.
The EMBI is not a pure measure of political risk. First, it reflects the dynamics
within international capital markets, which are external to domestic political eventsii.
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Second, it is largely determined by the government’s ability to pay its debt which is based
on the size (relative to exports), maturity (how long before it must make payments), and
composition of debt (if denominated in a foreign currency or linked to some benchmark
rate). Finally, the EMBI includes perceptions of willingness to pay debt. Candidates
claiming that they will not pay foreign debt while locals are starving (see Lula in the
1980s) or governments that prioritize redistribution of assets over protection of property
rights of asset-holders drive up political risk (Chávez since 1998).
Despite these limitations, the EMBI is the benchmark used by bondholders and it
is used in a number of political economy studies (Bernard and Leblang 2006, Spanakos
and Renno 2006, Spanakos and Renno, 2009). Moreover it is the best available measure
of investor perception of sovereign credit risk, and a baseline indicator of general credit
risk.
The next set of variables examines the claim that it is vulnerability to external
events that may more strongly affect vote choice. The analysis used the level of foreign
currency reserves as a proxy for access to foreign (hard) currency and vulnerability to
financial crises more generally. This variable was obtained in the International Financial
Statistics dataset from the International Monetary Fund and was logged to increase
comparability. Since credit risk is what is being investigated and so much Latin American
debt has been historically denominated in dollars or linked to the value of the dollar, this
indicator is especially important.
In addition to vulnerability to the external environment, it is also important to take
into consideration the liquidity of the global market and its appetite for risk. Two
variables are included in the model. The Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE)
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Volatility Index which indicates volatility over a period of 30 days in the S&P 500 is a
widely used indicator of risk appetite among investors. Since investors consider global
market conditions, the greater the volatility in the S&P 500, the more willing investors
should be to purchase higher-risk instruments, such as emerging market bonds.
Additionally, as the export profiles of the economies analyzed earn a significant
portion of money from commodities and emerging markets are more likely to receive
investment booms when commodity prices increase, a measure of global commodity
prices, PALLFNFW, derived from the IMF is used. The PALLFNFW is a combined
measure of the price indices for all fuel and non-fuel commodities. This indicator is used
because it is the most holistic index of commodity prices and all of the governments
analyzed here, to varying degrees, export petroleum and/or natural gas, as well as other
commodities.
The model also controls for indicators of the fundamentals of the economy, such
as Consumer Price Index (CPI) and unemployment. These are the traditionally analyzed
economic indicators in the literature and one should expect that deterioration in both of
these factors should lead to increased support to left-wing parties, especially
unemployment.
Finally, the model attempts to control for political and institutional variables by
including an indicator of Central Bank independence measured by the length of tenure of
each bank’s president or governor (Cukierman 1992, Cukierman et al. 1992). The
expectation is that longer tenure is perceived by investors to mean more independence
and therefore should reduce the effect of financial indicators on vote for any party. It also
controls for political party system institutionalization, measured as the average age of the
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top two governing parties and the main opposition parties or a subset of according to the
situation in each country, as defined in the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al.
2001). This variable is included in the model to control for the inchoate characteristics of
certain Latin American party systems, which could weaken the influence of parties and
ideology on economic turbulence. The expectation is that older party systems will
decrease risk, because it increases the “brand names” of parties. Party system should also
condition the uncertainty present in elections in which there are changes towards the left.
4. Analysis
The pooled sample of countries is analyzed using cross-sectional time-series
linear models with feasible generalized least squares correcting for AR (1)
autocorrelation within panels and heteroskedasticity across panels. Fixed effects by
country are estimated to control for other country specific factors that are not modeled.
For each individual electoral episode, Prais-Winsten AR(1) regression is used with robust
standard errors, correcting serious autocorrelation problems found within panels and for
cross-panel heteroskedasticity violation. iii A lagged term of the dependent variable to
control for possible layover effects from one month to the next is also included in the
models, when Prais-Winsten regression is insufficient to correct for serial correlation.
This is the case of the 2006 Brazilian presidential elections.
Results are presented in tables 1 and 2. Table 1 analyzes the pooled sample and
each country separately. The results indicate that vote for left-wing parties in the pooled
sample is affected by Consumer Price Index, EMBI, VIX, Central Bank independence,
and age of the party system. As inflation worsens, as risk increases and as Central Bank
independence increases, vote for the left grows. That is, the left benefits from

14

deterioration of inflation and risk, and gains when financial institutions become stronger,
increasing the credibility of the system. On the other hand, as the international financial
environment, measured by VIX, deteriorates, vote for the left also falls. Finally, party
age—a proxy for the stability of the party system, has an unexpected effect in that as it
increases voters are less likely to vote for the left.
These results, however, vary tremendously by country and by election. In Brazil,
EMBI, VIX, and Central Bank independence have similar effects of the combined sample
on PT vote, but commodity prices also become influential, reducing the vote for the left.
Hence, as this specific indicator improves, a signal that the economy also improves, vote
for the left decreases. Finally, in Mexico, only VIX, with a negative effect on vote for the
left, has a statistically significant impact on vote for the PRD.
(table 1 here)
Table 2 explores variations in the effects of the independent variables by election
year by using a Prais-Winsten Regression for each of the election years. Again, in
Mexico’s elections, economic variables have limited effect on vote for the PRD. The only
variables that have a statistically significant impact on vote are political and institutional.
The effect of party system age varies from 2000 to 2006 with the former contradicting
expectations and the latter conforming. The fact that in 2006 the PRD was a serious
contender and in 2000 it was not could explain the variance, as could the further
consolidation of the democratic system. The expectation here is that as Latin American
political party systems consolidate, parties of the left, which may have had historic
interests in undermining the political system, are seen as increasingly viable stakeholders
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within the system. As a result, voters can be confident that a vote for the left means
(possible) reform not revolution.
In Brazil, the elections of 1994 and 1998 are combined to estimate feasible
generalized least squares with each election as a panel. This was done because the
number of cases in each of the separate elections was too small to allow a reliable
analysis. In 1994 and 1998, the PT candidate was the runner-up in the elections, but lost
both elections in the first (and only) round to Fernando Henrique Cardoso from the
Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB). The results from these elections are the
ones that most closely approximate expectations. That is, as unemployment increased,
and as the exchange rate deteriorated, vote intention for the PT increased. In this way,
vote intention followed expectations from the classical retrospective economic voting in
which the opposition benefits from the worsening of the economy.
However, the same result was not seen in terms of inflation. As inflation
increased, the less likely voters were to vote for the PT. This is expected because both in
1994 and 1998, but more clearly in the latter, the incumbent administration, closely
associated to the control of inflation through the Real Stabilization Plan, adopted an
exonerating posture claiming that the rise of inflation was not its responsibility. It also
could argue that Lula had no viable alternative to the government’s plan. On the contrary,
the PSDB government claimed credit for drastically reducing inflation in Brazil and,
further, that they were the best equipped to maintain inflation levels low, especially in a
deteriorating international environment. The negative effect of the VIX variable on vote
for the left confirms this interpretation.
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The age of the Party System also behaves as expected: the older the system, the
more likely to support the PT.iv This was particularly evident in analysis of the 2002
elections in which reporters argued that the PT had ‘evolved’ from a political party of
‘pure opposition’ to a more ‘pragmatic reformer.’ Cynics, particularly after the various
corruption scandals that plagued the first Lula administration, argued that the PT had in
fact become exactly like all the other parties. Regardless, it is clear that voters saw the
democratic and capitalist system of Brazil less at risk from a PT presidency in 2002 and
2006 than they had in earlier elections.
The variables that measure risk, both domestic and country-specific, the EMBI
and global and international, VIX, have similar effects to that of the entire sample.
Increases in domestic risk increase the likelihood of voting for the left: the logic of
deteriorating economic conditions applies here too. The higher the risk, the more likely
one is to vote for the left (in all cases except 2006 the opposition). However, as the risk in
the international environment increases, the less likely voters are to support the left. This
is related to the rhetoric of the then incumbent PSDB party that economic turbulence,
especially in 1998, was caused by international economic crises and that the Cardoso
administration was the most capable to confront the crises.
In 2002, when Lula da Silva from the PT won the elections, the only variables
correlated with vote for the left in Brazil are those related to the international
environment. Both commodity prices as well as international risk decrease the likelihood
of voting for the left. Again, a risky international environment hurts the vote for the left.
Finally, in 2006, two distinct models are estimated, one in which a lagged
dependent variable is included to attenuate problems of serial correlation, quite high in
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this panel. As unemployment increases, vote intentions for the PT are negatively affected.
As inflation and the EMBI increase, the more likely voters are to support the PT. These
results are hard to explain, because they show that voters are not necessarily punishing
the incumbent party for increases in inflation and risk, but are on unemployment. A
possible explanation is that left-wing supporters care only about reducing unemployment
even if this leads to increases in inflation, which does follow expectations of the partisan
hypotheses. Another possible explanation is that Lula was indeed successful in reducing
inflation and country risk during his first mandate far more than many had expected. As a
result, even if these numbers increased, the increase was slight compared to expectations
and the events of 2002.
(table 2 here)
5. Conclusions
The analysis shows that the effect of the economic variables on vote for left-wing
parties varies tremendously by the characteristics of the election. In Mexico, economic
performance has not been influential in affecting vote intentions for the PRD. Political
and institutional variables seem more important in Mexico. At the same time, in the
absence of an incumbent government of the left to analyze, and with only two
presidential elections occurring during its ‘democratic period,’ it is difficult to make any
generalizable claims about the Mexican case.
In Brazil, the effects of economic variables are more tangible. There is partial
support for hypotheses based on the traditional economic vote as well as hypotheses
related to partisan explanations. PT voters in Brazil care about unemployment which
follows the partisan model in that issues of development and employment are more

18

important for left-wing party supporters than other factors. Interestingly, voters behave as
though there is a Philips Curve (Stokes 2001) in avoiding the left when inflation increases
in 1994 and 1998 but they are less effected in 2006 once inflation is largely under control
(Spanakos and Renno 2006).
Overall, there is considerable causal heterogeneity by election, which signals that
voters employ distinct vote calculi in the different elections, depending on economic
conditions and what party is the incumbent. The complexity of economic conditions in
Latin America, even post-stabilization plans, still requires combining distinct
explanations on how the economy affects vote intentions. This is especially important
because the viable presidential candidates in Brazil and Mexico are from political parties
with long histories and relatively deep levels of institutionalization, something that is not
found in other countries in the region. That vote intention is so complicated in even these
cases suggests that it may be equally so across the region and that truly no single theory
explains all cases adequately.
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Table 1: FGLS coeficients for Vote for Left-Wing Parties in Brazil (1994-2006) and
Mexico (2000-2006).
Pooled
Brazil
Mexico
Sample
Unemployment
0.63
0.74
0.37
(0.51)
(0.65)
(0.94)
Consumer Price Index
0.15
0.08
0.32
(0.06)**
(0.12)
(0.67)
Exchange Rate
-2.76
-3.67
-4.51
(1.81)
(3.22)
(2.98)
EMBI
0.01
0.01
0.01
(0.00)**
(0.00)*
(0.01)
pallfnfw
-0.02
-0.08
0.00
(0.03)
(0.04)*
(0.06)
VIX
-0.45
-0.46
-0.67
(0.10)*** (0.14)*** (0.18)***
Central Bank
0.61
0.84
0.24
Independence
(0.16)*** (0.21)*** (0.50)
Age of Party System
-1.19
-0.13
-0.33
(0.47)**
(1.24)
(0.91)
Mexico
25.87
(16.13)
Constant
31.92
23.82
42.72
(7.85)*** (11.44)** (92.49)
Observations
311
143
168
Number of electioncode 6
4
2
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 2: Prais Winsten Coefficients for Vote for Left-Wing Parties by Elections: Brazil
and Mexico.
Mexico Mexico
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
2000
2006
1994-1998 2002
2006
2006A
Lag Vote Left
0.55
(0.10)***
Unemployment 3.06
0.52
1.68
4.94
-6.17
-6.92
(2.64)
(0.35)
(0.37)*** (3.56)
(5.51)
(3.37)**
Consumer
-3.60
-0.99
-0.97
8.25
7.13
Price Index
(3.35)
(0.27)*** (2.06)
(6.33)
(3.83)*
Exchange Rate 3.89
51.62
-0.46
5.57
4.99
(9.04)
(15.59)*** (5.97)
(22.85)
(36.51)
EMBI
-0.01
-0.03
0.01
0.00
0.13
0.12
(0.01)
(0.08)
(0.01)*
(0.00)
(0.10)
(0.07)*
pallfnfw
0.17
-0.13
0.23
-0.58
0.15
0.21
(0.30)
(0.09)
(0.30)
(0.21)*** (0.17)
(0.13)
VIX
-0.12
-0.12
-0.56
-0.29
-0.58
-0.12
(1.27)
(0.38)
(0.18)*** (0.17)*
(0.71)
(0.59)
Central Bank
0.49
0.14
0.09
3.58
-1.12
-1.78
Independence
(0.20)** (0.64)
(0.46)
(2.15)
(1.98)
(1.28)
Party System
-4.27
9.33
6.11
3.33
Age
(2.46)*
(3.20)*** (2.07)***
(6.65)
Constant
83.72
21.14
-65.11
44.96
-1,284.25 -1,038.97
(92.38)
(335.01) (45.76)
(173.95)
(1,039.17) (606.99)*
Observations
95
73
38
60
45
44
R-squared
0.25
0.47
0.87
0.14
0.71
0.89
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

It is measured in terms of basis points (bps) where 100 basis points is the equivalent of 1
percent.
ii
When there is greater liquidity, interest in investing in emerging markets, or when
commodity prices are high, investors will be less exacting. Perception that certain other
countries or regions are ‘hot,’ can reduce market demand for the debt of a particular
country and increase ‘risk.’ Similarly, internal dynamics of capital markets can punish
one country for the failures of another, ironically even if the former is seen as relatively
successful. This was the case in 2001, when traders who lost money or could not sell
Argentine debt sold Brazilian debt to cover their losses, increasing Brazil’s EMBI.
iii
The dependent and independent variables were tested for unit root problems using the
Dickey-Fuller test and detected problems only in the CPI variable. Given that it did not
present consistent effects on EMBI, it does not appear to be a substantial problem. A
violation of homoskedasticity was detected in the pooled sample using the BreuschPagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity as well as a problem o first order
i
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correlation using the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data. This was correct
by using Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression for the pooled data and PraisWinsten AR(1) regression for country-specific analysis.
iv
Unfortunately, due to collinearity problems, this variable was dropped in the 2002
elections.
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